Do Equity Incentives Drive Executives to Fudge Their Financials? Who Cares?

According to a 2005 research study, executives with equity incentives (stock options and restricted stock grants) were more likely to “smooth” earnings so that they met or barely beat analysts’ projections. And the longer the continuation of the equity incentive plan, the greater the “management” of earnings.

The researchers summarized the reasoning behind the behavior this way: as executives’ wealth became concentrated in one holding (various forms of their own stock), the incentive to reduce the risk/volatility of that investment increased dramatically, both psychologically and in economic terms. The natural human reaction to a perceived risk is to take action to reduce that risk. In the case of equity-based incentives, executives have two options:

  1. Liquidate the concentrated investment to allow diversification
  2. Manipulate earnings to maximize ongoing stock performance

Note carefully my wording. The goal is not a one-time earnings windfall. Selling after one of those would attract too much of the wrong kind of attention. The goal is to imitate Jack Welsh and GE and hit the earnings projections quarter after quarter so that analysts can make ‘prescient’ projections quarter after quarter and everyone is happy.Or are they?

Which begs the BIG QUESTION:

Is this:

  1. Virtuous behavior by corporate executives
  2. A victimless crime
  3. An outrage that must be redressed

Before you pass judgment, let me summarize the arguments for each position.

  1. Equity incentives are designed to focus executives like a laser beam on increasing shareholder value. The data clearly shows that this theory works in practice!
  2. So what if executives fudge the books a little? Who cares? Not their families, who have already calculated the value of those options/shares and applied them to future vacations. Not the company board members, who are also heavily leveraged in company stock. They have the very same risk profile and are likely to See No Evil. Not the analysts who make those earnings projections. All market data aside, who wouldn’t want to be told on a regular basis “you’re absolutely right, you genius!”? And finally, not the employees in the employee stock purchase program. I must admit that after examining the issue theseprograms are the most ingenious and effective hush money ever spent! Corporate employees have access to all the incriminating data, but if the ESPP shows a significant profit they’ll all cheerfully whistle past the graveyard on the way to the bank. After all, they worked for it!
  3. This is an outrage that must be redressed! Unfortunately for all the beneficiaries of these “benign misdemeanors”, there’s this thing called the “slippery slope”. Maybe one quarter you delay booking a couple of deals. Or shuffle expenses from one unit to another. Then suddenly there’s a suitor at your door so you “miss” your revenue and profit targets by “oh so little” and you don’t have to pay out that big bonus pool to your employees. And that pile of cash you reserved is now looki ng pretty on your financials. Everyone is happy at the acquisition closing, but the truth soon reveals itself and mass layoffs and stock price swoons ensue. Speaking hypothetically, of course.

So what do you think?

UPDATE: Wow! Great responses! Check this one out:

“Who gets hurt? Interesting question. As a former Enron executive, I can assure everyone that the stakes are very high indeed. In the Enron, MCI and other famous cases, billions of dollars and thousands of jobs were sacrificed on the altar of quarterly earnings. Most cases of earnings management end less dramatically than those famous cases but the principle (or lack thereof)are the same - it is like smoking - highly addictive and always fatal but over an always uncertain time frame.”

Bravo, Mike! That is my experience, and I think it’s epitomized in Sir Walter Scott’s famous quip “Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive”. So for at least 400 years people have instinctively recognized the shady side of earnings managment!

Check it out: A funny comic explaining the 2007-2008 Mortgage crisis.





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Comments

  1. Todd Rhoad's Gravatar Comment by Todd Rhoad on June 21st, 2008 at 5:30 pm

    According to the book “Take on the street” by Arthur Levitt, even the analysts are ‘persuaded’ to make certain recommendations on particular companies. It would appear that equity incentives convince almost everyone to make the wealthy even wealthier.

  2. Mike's Gravatar Comment by Mike on June 23rd, 2008 at 10:31 am

    Do Equity Incentives Drive Executives to Fudge Financials?
    Yes!
    Who Cares?
    Almost Nobody. Responsible Executives should care a lot.

    The crux of the problem is the decision making time frame. For any given decision, the best decision for this quarter may be very different from the best decision over some longer time frame. When bonuses and even executive survival depend on quarterly measurement, optimal quarterly decisions get made even when the long term consequences are less than optimal or even bad. Common practice is for senior management to pay lip service to long term while driving everyone in the organization to meet quarterly goals.

    This pattern develops and becomes common practice when management teams succumb to the holy grail of meeting quarterly earnings expectations. Analysts know full well that the value of the any enterprise is a long term question but they get graded on the accuracy of their quarter earnings forecasts.

    Once this cycle gets going, it only stops when the inevitable problems eventually show up and someone forces a management change with a new CEO. The new CEO gets a short grace period and then the cycle repeats.

    Want to know why Warren Buffet is perceived to be so successful? He is one of very few corporate leaders who can get away with making multi-year decisions in a world dominated by quarterly thinking.

    The “theory” of matching management incentives to equity performance is valid. The “practice” of doing it on a quarterly basis verges on criminal negligence.

  3. Mike's Gravatar Comment by Mike on June 23rd, 2008 at 4:43 pm

    Todd,

    You’re right. The question is who gets hurt? I’ve heard arguments that this is all prudent business management, but my gut says otherwise.

    Other Mike,

    Very well put, sir!

    Mike

  4. Mike's Gravatar Comment by Mike on June 23rd, 2008 at 5:41 pm

    Who gets hurt? Interesting question. As a former Enron executive, I can assure everyone that the stakes are very high indeed. In the Enron, MCI and other famous cases, billions of dollars and thousands of jobs were sacrificed on the altar of quarterly earnings. Most cases of earnings management end less dramatically than those famous cases but the principle (or lack thereof)are the same - it is like smoking - highly addictive and always fatal but over an always uncertain time frame.

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